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ABSTRACT
This article aims to reorient thinking about the relationship between
the long-standing social model of disability and the rapidly
emerging human rights model. In particular, it contests the
influential view that the latter develops and improves upon the
former (the improvement thesis) and argues instead that the two
models are complementary (the complementarity thesis). The
article begins with a discursive analysis of relevant documents to
investigate how each of the two models has been used in the
crafting and monitoring of the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities. This highlights the increasing importance
of the human rights model in this policy context. It also provides
examples of the operation of the two models which inform the
remainder of the discussion. We then critique the comparisons
between the models which underpin the improvement thesis;
and, drawing on Foucault’s technologies of power and Beckett and
Campbell’s ‘oppositional device’ methodology, deepen and develop
this comparative analysis. The result, we argue, is that the two
models have different subjects and different functions. In the
human rights context, their roles are complementary and supportive.
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1. Introduction
For the past 40 years, ‘models’ of disability have featured prominently in shaping disability
politics, Disability Studies and human rights for disabled people. The ‘social model of dis-
ability’,1 which presents disability as a form of socially created oppression, has been foun-
dational. This social model, an idea rooted in the disabled people’s movement, entails a
political repurposing of the idea of ‘disability’, whereby that term is used to describe the
socially created disadvantage and marginalisation experienced by people who have (or
are perceived to have) ‘impairments’. At its heart is the distinction between socially
created exclusion and disadvantage on the one hand, and the particular mind and body
traits of individuals on the other. Thus, in 1981, Disabled People’s International (DPI)
drew a distinction between ‘the functional limitation within the individual caused by phys-
ical, mental or sensory impairment’ and the ‘loss or limitation of opportunities to take part
in the normal life of the community due to physical and social barriers’2; while some years
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earlier, the UK-based organisation Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation
(UPIAS) described ‘disability’ as a form of oppression and as ‘something imposed on
top of our impairments, by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from
full participation in society’.3
From a social model perspective, disability is therefore viewed as a socially produced
injustice which it is possible to challenge and eliminate through radical social change.
Oliver acknowledged that, when introducing the phrase the ‘social model of disability’
in the early 1980s, he was drawing upon the distinction originally made between impair-
ment and disability by UPIAS.4 He helpfully distinguished this social model understand-
ing of disability from an array of traditional approaches which he classified, collectively, as
the ‘individual model of disability’ and which he described as ‘locat[ing] the “problem” of
disability within the individual and… see[ing] the causes of this problem as stemming
from the functional limitations or psychological losses which are assumed to arise from
disability’.5
Since the early 1980s, the social model has generated a wealth of literature which crosses
geographical and disciplinary divides. Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, there are now sig-
nificant inconsistencies in its articulation and usage.6 The consequent potential for con-
fusion is exacerbated by the fact that the term is often used without an accompanying
explanation of exactly how it is understood by the particular author.7 Miller is therefore
unlikely to be alone in his view that using the social model as an evaluative framework
is ‘a path fraught with difficulties’.8 In an attempt to provide some clarity about our
own use of the terminology, we will use the term ‘social model’ here to refer to the
approach of UPIAS and DPI set out above and, where necessary, differentiate it from
other usage of the phrase by describing it as the UPIAS/DPI version of the social model.
An array of alternatives to the social model has emerged over the past three decades. In
the context of human rights law and policy, by far the most important and influential of
these is the human rights model of disability. According to one of the earliest explanations:
The human rights model focuses on the inherent dignity of the human being and sub-
sequently, but only if necessary, on the person’s medical characteristics. It places the individ-
ual centre stage in all decisions affecting him/her and, most importantly, locates the main
‘problem’ outside the person and in society.9
By locating the main problem in societal factors external to the individual, this account
highlights similarities between the human rights and social models of disability. Indeed,
as Kanter has acknowledged, the two terms are sometimes used synonymously.10 They
are, however, also sometimes presented as contrasting models – with the human rights
model being treated as a departure from the social model.11 Although still relatively
new, since the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) in 2006,12 use of the human rights model has rapidly increased. Thus, as Section 2
below demonstrates, it is the human rights model, and not the social model, to which the
UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the CRPD Committee) now
refers when monitoring the efforts of State parties to implement the CRPD.
It is the relationship between the social and human rights models that provides the
focus for this article. The view that the human rights model extends and improves
upon the social model is gaining prevalence.13 We contest this approach, which we
term the ‘improvement thesis’, and argue instead for what we term the ‘complementarity
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thesis’. According to our complementarity thesis, the relationship between the two models
is one in which neither can be viewed as an improvement on the other because each has
distinctive roles to play. In the furtherance of human rights for disabled people, these roles
are complementary and symbiotic.
The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. Section 2 presents a discur-
sive analysis of the operation of the two models in the making and monitoring of the
CRPD. This demonstrates the increasing prevalence of the human rights model in this
particular law and policy context; and provides concrete examples of the distinct roles
or operations of each of the models. Section 3 sets out the improvement thesis and cri-
tiques the comparisons between the models which underpin it. Section 4 develops the
complementarity thesis by identifying and explaining the key distinctions between the
two models and their roles as what we term ‘oppositional devices’. This analysis of their
respective functions or operations will be supported by examples drawn from the discus-
sion of the roles played by each model in the making and monitoring of the CRPD in
Section 2. Finally, in Section 5, we present our conclusions.
2. Comparing the roles of the two models in the making and monitoring of
the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: a case study
2.1. Purpose and method
The drafting of the CRPD, and the CRPD Committee’s on-going monitoring of its
implementation, provides interesting material for an exploration of the roles played by
the social and human rights models. Our study had two main aims: first, to understand
the extent to which there has been a shift away from the social model and toward the
human rights model in the work of those involved in drafting and monitoring the Con-
vention; second, to identify any particular roles (the operations) performed by the two
models in these contexts.
This case study takes the form of a discursive analysis of relevant documentation.14 For
the drafting phase, we analysed records of the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee
(AHC) – the Committee established by the UN General Assembly to draft the CRPD.15
For the monitoring phase, we analysed concluding observations issued by the CRPD Com-
mittee prior to the Summer of 2019. Within each of these documents we carried out elec-
tronic searches using the terms ‘social’, ‘human rights’, ‘model’ and ‘approach’. The results
were then checked for relevance to the social model of disability and the human rights
model of disability, with text not connected to discussions of either model being excluded.
Adopting an inductive approach, we sought to identify any patterns of usage and explicit
or implicit interpretations of each model within the documents.
For these purposes, we adopt a Foucauldian understanding of discourse, as that which
shapes and creates meaning-systems which have gained the status of ‘truth’ and come to
determine how we define and organise ourselves and our social worlds.16 Discourses con-
tinually shape and reshape our social interaction. The discourse analysis carried out here
provides a basis for reflection, in this Section and in Section 4 below, on how the two
models operate; the struggles that have taken place over whether to approach the
‘problem’ of disability through a social or a human rights model; and how these discourses
influence associated institutions and processes.17
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2.2. Making the convention
2.2.1. Role of the social model
The social model is widely acknowledged to have played a significant role in shaping the
CRPD. According to Kayess and French, it exercised an ‘enormous influence’18 over the
treaty. Traustadóttir describes it as providing the ‘knowledge base which… informed’
the CRPD19; and Degener observes that, as the ‘motto of the international disability move-
ment… it served as a powerful tool to demand legal reform’.20 The social model appears to
have been understood broadly in this sense during the drafting of the CRPD21 – although
some variation in perspective and understanding of the model was inevitable given the
number of people involved in the process and their linguistic, political and geographic
diversity.
From our analysis it emerged that reference was made to the social model in four types
of context, in each of which it was used to perform a different role: (A) as a general frame
of reference; (B) to provide definitions; (C) to promote equality and inclusion; (D) to
promote solidarity. These will now be discussed in turn:
(A) use of the social model as a general underpinning frame of reference. A number of
references in the AHC documents acknowledge the important role played by ideas con-
nected to the UPIAS/DPI social model of disability. Relatively early in the drafting
process, in the AHC’s second session in July 2003, attention was drawn to the distinction
– so key to the social model of disability – between ‘experiences of impairment and experi-
ences of disability’.22 The significance of this social understanding of ‘disability’ was
stressed by the Costa Rica delegation in the AHC’s seventh and penultimate session,
when it said:
The most important point [is] that since this process started there has been a consensus on
the fact that the medical model of disability, which looks at disability as a defect or a disease
that needs to be cured through medical intervention, has been completely left behind. The
model that now prevails is the social model, in which the problem is defined as interaction
between the setting in which the person with impairment lives and the person.23
That delegation also drew attention to the connection between the social model of disabil-
ity and human rights, observing that:
The social model of disability emphasizes that persons with disabilities are prevented from
reaching their full potential not because of their impairment, but as a result of legal, attitu-
dinal, architectural, communications and other discriminatory barriers.… The social model
of disability, combined with a rights-based approach: (i) recognizes persons with disabilities
as rights-holders who can and should determine the course of their lives to the same extent as
any member of society; and (ii) defines limitations imposed by the social and physical
environment as infringements on people’s rights.24
(B) use of the social model to provide definitions. The social model of disability featured in
two types of debate concerning definitional issues: first, debates about whether the social
model should be explicitly mentioned in the Convention; and second, debates about how
disability should be defined, if a definition of it were to be included.
Turning to the first of these issues, early in the life of the AHC (in its third session),
India and Jordan proposed that specific mention of the social model should be made in
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the ‘general principles’ article of the Convention25 – an approach supported by Yemen.26
In the AHC’s eighth and final session, China proposed adding the following paragraph to
the preamble:
Recognizing an evolving concept of disability where disability is a state of participation
restriction result[ing] from interaction between an individual with impairments and environ-
mental barriers.27
Whilst this proposal did not explicitly mention the phrase ‘social model of disability’, as
the Chair of the AHC acknowledged, it was a proposal that would ‘add language reflecting
the social model of disability’ into the Convention text.28 With some adjustment, it found
expression in the final text of the CRPD, paragraph (e) of the preamble which reads:
disability… results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal
and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on
an equal basis with others.
The second and related issue, of how, if at all, ‘disability’ should be defined, surfaced at
various times in the AHC negotiations.29 Ultimately, no definition of disability was
included. Nevertheless, even at an early stage, there was reportedly ‘general agreement’
that if a definition was included, it should be one that reflected the social model of disabil-
ity.30 The daily summaries of the AHC’s discussions indicate that the relevance of the
social model to any definition of, or guidance on, ‘disability’ appeared to be accepted in
statements made by the Republic of Korea,31 Guatemala,32 Ethiopia,33 Israel,34 Thailand,35
New Zealand,36 Norway,37 Serbia and Montenegro,38 Disabled People’s International39
the European Disability Forum,40 the National Human Rights Institutions Group41 and
the International Disability Caucus.42 Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic, by contrast,
favoured attempts to incorporate elements of both the ‘medical’ and the ‘social’ model of
disability43 – an approach which the World Health Organisation asserted had been
adopted in its International Classification of Functioning Disability and Health (ICF).44
Shortly before the AHC’s eighth and final session, a declaration was signed by partici-
pants (including representatives of governments, disabled people’s organisations, national
human rights institutions, non-governmental organisations, UN agencies and civil society
from the Asia-Pacific region) at a UNESCAP workshop in Bangkok. Amongst the requests
included in this document was the call to members of the AHC to ensure that ‘any
definition of “disability” included in the Convention should reflect a social model
approach’.45 The detailed implications of defining disability in accordance with the
social model were, however, not the subject of extensive debate in the published AHC
documents – although several references were made to the model by Australia in connec-
tion with its arguments for including a definition of disability in the Convention. Thus in
the AHC’s fourth session Australia noted that, while the ‘social model of disability is
important,… disability seen purely as a function of the environment would render a
definition unworkable’, and took the view that a definition of ‘disability’ should clearly
identify ‘the people entitled to protections under the Convention’ and that these should
include people with ‘physical, mental, intellectual disabilities as well as future, past and
imputed disabilities’.46 In the seventh session, Australia proposed a detailed definition
of disability based on an articulation of various kinds of impairment or functional limit-
ation.47 According to the daily summary of discussions, Australia stated that ‘the social
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model of disability offers a theoretical framework by which disability can be understood’, a
strict view of which may lead to the view that, ‘once the barriers created by society are
removed, the state has no further obligation toward the person with a disability’.48 It
claimed that the definition it proposed, which drew on the concepts of ‘impairment’ as
well as ‘disability’, was consistent with the social model.49 While this approach appears
to reflect the basic tenets of the UPIAS/DPI model, the daily summary also reports that
Australia described the social model as incorporating ‘impairment, which is the physio-
logical function, disability, which recognises the interaction of disability with the environ-
ment, and the notion of handicap, which refers to the disadvantage created by the
impairment or disability’.50 It should be stressed, however, that the UPIAS/DPI social
model does not make any distinction between ‘disability’ and ‘handicap’ – using the
notion of ‘disability’ to refer to the disadvantage and oppression caused by environmental,
legal, attitudinal and other factors external to individuals with impairments.
As mentioned above, the CRPD includes no formal definition of disability – a term not
defined in the Convention’s definitions provision (Article 2). Guidance on its meaning is,
however, provided in paragraph (e) of the preamble (set out above). This reflects a classic
UPIAS/DPI social model understanding of ‘disability’ which is distinguished from the
notion of ‘impairment’.
In addition, non-exhaustive guidance about the meaning of the phrase ‘persons with
disabilities’ – the people in whose favour the CRPD should operate – is set out in
Article 1, which articulates the purpose of the treaty. According to this:
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or
sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.51
While Article 1’s focus on impairment and participation restrictions and inequality result-
ing from ‘various barriers’ is closely aligned with the UPIAS/DPI social model, the
language of ‘persons with disabilities’ is not. On the basis of this model of disability, the
term ‘disabled people’ refers to people experiencing a particular type of oppression or dis-
advantage; and ‘people with impairments’ refers to people who have some kind of (per-
ceived) functional limitation or body/mind difference. ‘Persons with disabilities’,
however, makes little sense.
Reasons for preferring the terminology of ‘people with disabilities’ to ‘disabled people’
are advanced by proponents of ‘people first’ language,52 according to which reference to
the person should be situated before reference to their (perceived) functional limitations.
While the term ‘people with impairments’ would appear to achieve consistency with the
terminological implications of both people first and social model approaches, there is
some discomfort with the term ‘impairment’ – which is sometimes regarded as
affirming and reifying the societal norms which stigmatise body–mind difference.53 In
other words, there is an argument that what societies determine to be ‘impairments’ is
socially/culturally determined and a result of ‘ableism’.54 Despite the existence of lively
debate about the choice and implications of disability-related terminology, the issue
does not surface in the published documents of the AHC and the use of ‘people with dis-
abilities’ does not therefore appear to have been based on any articulated rationale. The
absence of discussion on this terminological point seems likely to be due, at least in
part, to the multi-national and multi-lingual nature of the interactions. Some of the
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associated complexity is evident from observations such as those of Traustadóttir55 that
the terms ‘impairment’ and ‘disability’ do not translate well into any Nordic language.
Whilst explicable, the result is confusing. The CRPD sometimes uses the term ‘disabil-
ity’ in the UPIAS/DPI social model sense of societally-created oppression or disadvantage
and sometimes uses it to mean ‘impairment’. For this reason, Kayess and French argue
that:
In spite of its professed adherence to a social model of disability,… the CRPD perpetuates,
and perhaps now irrevocably entrenches, the contemporary conceptual confusion between
impairment and disability.56
(C) use of the social model to promote equality and inclusion. The social model was used
to bolster arguments against using disability, impairment or diagnosis as justifications for
exclusion, segregation, or lower levels of rights protection in AHC debates on four types of
issue in particular: first, involuntary detention; second, legal capacity; third, education; and
fourth, rehabilitation. The use made of the social model in each of these four types of
debate will now be addressed in turn.
First, in relation to involuntary detention, theWorld Network of Users and Survivors of
Psychiatry argued that depriving disabled people of their liberty in circumstances which
would not ground deprivations of liberty for non-disabled people would be to impose
‘a social disadvantage’ on disabled people and ‘under the social model, that is discrimi-
nation’.57 In its view, the phrase ‘deprivation of liberty shall in no case be based on disabil-
ity’ was preferable to the phrase ‘deprivation of liberty shall in no case be based on the
existence of disability’. Its explanation for this was that the former ‘is simple and clear,
and treats disability as a social category comparable to gender and race, which is the pos-
ition that people with disabilities have asserted throughout the convention process’ while
[t]he phrase “existence of disability” has a medical model tone’.58
Second, in relation to legal capacity, legal rights have very commonly been restricted or
removed on the basis of impairment or diagnosis. In the AHC, Thailand noted this as a
concern, and acknowledged its inconsistency with the social model. According to the
report, it ‘expressed support for the social model of disability, i.e. the idea that society
imposes disability upon people’ and stated that ‘[l]imiting the legal capacity of people
with disabilities would reinforce the medical model of disability’.59
Third, in relation to the right to education, reference was made to the social model of
disability in connection to arguments for an education system in which disabled people
have choices equivalent to those of others. According to the British Council of Organis-
ations of Disabled People in a submission to the AHC:
Much of the special education system was developed without consultation with persons with
disabilities, and it thus reflects the medical model approach, which should now shift to a
social model approach.60
Similarly, the Centre for Studies in Inclusive Education (UK) urged that the CRPD:
should fully reflect the social model of disability, focusing government obligations on remov-
ing the barriers to full participation in education by persons with disabilities. Education of
some learners in separate settings because of their disabilities or impairments reflects and
perpetuates a view of disability premised on the medical and charity models of disability.61
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Finally, the need to articulate the right to rehabilitation in a manner consistent with the
social rather than the medical model of disability was stressed by a number of AHC
members.62 This reflects an underpinning concern about traditional tendencies to medi-
calise all aspects of disabled people’s lives at the expense of developing non-medical sup-
ports and services essential for independent living and inclusion in education, work and
community life. According to the International Disability Caucus:
An overriding goal of the IDC is that rehabilitation is no longer seen only in the context of
health or in the medical model. Habilitation and rehabilitation bring new skills and knowl-
edge that allow the individuals to cope with disability in their daily lives.… Rehabilitation has
more to do with education than health.63
Rehabilitation International and the International Disability Caucus were of the view that
habilitation and rehabilitation should be dealt with in a separate provision from the right
to health because ‘the placement of both in proximity to health risks reinforcing the
medical model of disability and is a violation of the rights and dignity of people with dis-
abilities’.64 The Israel delegation also supported separating these issues into two separate
articles, suggesting (without further explanation) that this would be ‘an affirmation of the
social model combined with the medical model’.65 The Costa Rica delegation challenged
what it regarded as the mistaken view that dealing with rehabilitation and health in the
same provision ‘would imply an endorsement of a medical model approach towards reha-
bilitation’ – arguing that rehabilitation was a key component of a broadly understood right
to health but that rehabilitation services need not and should not be framed by a ‘medical
perspective’.66
The use of the social model to support arguments that rights should not be restricted
simply on the basis of the existence of an impairment or of a diagnosis is rooted in the
political demand, at the heart of the UPIAS/DPI social model, to shift policy responses
to disability away from ones in which control over the lives of disabled people is
handed over to medical and associated professionals in contexts such as education,
employment, family life and healthcare. This concern runs through the entirety of the
final text of the CRPD. Its stated purpose is ‘to promote, protect and ensure the full
and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons
with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity’.67 It is expressed par-
ticularly emphatically in a number of provisions. Most notably, Article 14(1)(b), which
states that ‘the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty’;
and Article 23(4), which states that ‘[i]n no case shall a child be separated from parents
on the basis of a disability of either the child or one or both of the parents’. Furthermore,
the requirement that rights should be granted to disabled people ‘on an equal basis’ with
others is all-pervasive in the Convention text.
(D) use of the social model to promote solidarity between people with different impair-
ments. The final context in which reference was made to the social model of disability
was in connection with arguments that the text of the emerging Convention should not
distinguish between people on the basis of the type or severity of their impairment.68
The social model responds directly to this concern through its role in uniting people
with different types of ‘impairment’ in efforts to identify and resist disabling societal struc-
tures and practices.
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This use of the social model of disability to challenge impairment-based legal difference
is evident in the following report of a contribution by the International Disability Caucus
to the debate at the AHC’s seventh session:
…many states approach psychosocial disabilities using the medical model approach to
‘mental illness’. This excludes people with psychosocial disabilities from the broader realm
of people with disabilities and the protections they enjoy. However, the social model
approach recognizes that the stigma, prejudices and stereotypes associated with people
with psychosocial disabilities are themselves very disabling and often lead to violation of
their human rights.69
In connection with what eventually became Article 31 on data and statistics, the Lebanon
delegation argued that, in order to move from a medical to a social model of disability:
‘States should move away from statistical investigations that merely enumerate
impairments’.70
According to the daily reports of the third and fourth sessions, objections were
made to including the term ‘severe or multiple’ impairments or disabilities by the
Canada delegation because such terminology ‘creates a hierarchy within the disability
community and echoes a medical model rather than a social model of disability’.71 The
World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry and Disabled People’s Inter-
national similarly supported the deletion of this phrase from the draft text, describing
it as ‘a medical model concept’72 and as involving ‘terms which are based on the
medical model in making distinctions among people with disabilities on the basis of
severity’.73
This same social-model-inspired resistance to distinguishing between people with
different types of impairment appears to have been one of the arguments used to
oppose proposals to introduce the phrase ‘various forms’ of impairment or ‘disability’
into the Convention’s text. Thus, in explaining why it could not support a proposal to
introduce this phrase into what eventually became Article 8 of the CRPD,74 the Thailand
delegation stated that it ‘subscribes to the principle of the social model of disability’75; and
the Mexico delegation observed that references to ‘various forms’ of disability ‘reflects a
medical model perspective’.76
The final text of the CRPDmakes no reference to the severity of impairment although it
does stress ‘the need to promote and protect the human rights of all persons with disabil-
ities, including those who require more intensive support’77 – the nature and intensity of
support required depending on a whole range of factors. Neither does the CRPD generally
refer to type of impairment – although there are two exceptions, both of which are based
on reasons which do not undermine the solidarity between people with different impair-
ment types.
The first exception – in which reference is made to different types of impairment – is
Article 1 of the CRPD. As explained above, this provides guidance on the meaning of
‘persons with disabilities’, setting out a non-exhaustive list of types of impairment in
order to give a sense of the range of impairments. Such an approach was, arguably,
helpful in light of concerns that States might otherwise develop restrictive approaches
to the width of the population for whom the CRPD is relevant.
The second exception is Article 24(3)(c), according to which States undertake to ensure
‘that the education of persons, and in particular children, who are blind, deaf or deafblind,
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is delivered in the most appropriate languages and modes and means of communication
for the individual, and in environments which maximise academic and social develop-
ment’. While this is a reference to particular types of impairment, it is not one which
differentiates or separates children with such impairments from other disabled people.
Instead, it simply draws attention to the need to take the situation of children with the
specified impairments into account in the design of education systems and, in so doing,
responds to specific concerns raised in the AHC by the representative organisations of
people with these types of impairment.78
2.2.2. The role of the human rights model
Our searches of the online records of the AHC revealed no mention of the term ‘human
rights model’. This contrasts sharply with the frequent references made in the AHC dis-
cussions to the social model.
There is no explicit mention of the human rights model of disability in the text of the
CRPD. Close connections are drawn by human rights model proponents, however,
between the content of the CRPD and the human rights model. Authors such as Stein
and Stein have argued that the CRPD is ‘similarly orientated’79 to this model and
Degener has gone further, describing the CRPD as a codification of the human rights
model of disability.80
2.3. Monitoring the Convention
2.3.1. Role of the social model
In stark contrast with the AHC debates, the social model has seldom been mentioned in
the CRPD Committee’s concluding observations. It is explicitly mentioned in only one set
of concluding observations – on Peru – where the Committee expressed concern about the
lack of ‘a coherent and comprehensive strategy to implement the social model that the
Convention establishes’81; and recommended that steps be taken to
systematize the collection, analysis and dissemination of data, disaggregated by sex, age and
disability;… and develop gender-sensitive indicators to support legislative developments,
policymaking and institutional strengthening for monitoring and reporting on progress
made with regard to the implementation of the various provisions of the Convention,
taking into consideration the changes from the medical to the social model.82
Given the emphasis on the social model of disability in the AHC debates, it is surprising
that it has not been mentioned more often in concluding observations. It is noteworthy
that the Committee issued its concluding observations on Peru in April 2012, which
was very early in its working life – Peru being only the third country to be reviewed.
2.3.2. Role of the human rights model
From its eighth session (in Autumn 2012) onward, the CRPD Committee has made fre-
quent reference to the ‘human rights model of disability’ and other phrases which seem to
be used interchangeably – such as ‘human rights-based model of disability’,83 ‘human
rights model’84 and, in one instance, ‘social and human rights model of disability’85 and
‘human rights model for disability’.86 We identify four key ways in which use is made
of the ‘human rights model of disability’ in the concluding observations – each of
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which will be addressed in the remainder of this section. Prior to considering these,
however, it is important to note that the vast majority of references to the model (or a
variant of it) are not accompanied by explanation of what the Committee means by it.
Reference to the human rights model seems often simply to signal a contrast with, and
need for departure from, what the Committee describes as a ‘medical model’ approach
to disability policy (whereby healthcare professionals are granted undue power over the
life choices and opportunities of disabled people87); and as a form of shorthand for the
CRPD and its articulation of the responsibilities of governments to foster and bring
about the social change necessary for the protection and promotion of human rights
for disabled people. Where concluding observations do provide further explanation of
the human rights model, however, details will be highlighted below.
(A) recommendations to embed the human rights model of disability in disability strat-
egies, policy and legislation. First, the human rights model is mentioned in connection
with the need for States to embed it into disability strategies and across legislation and
policy. An example appears in the Committee’s observations on Argentina, where it
urged the development of ‘a broad and comprehensive strategy to realise all the rights
set out in the Convention, taking due account of the human rights model of disability’.88
Similar observations, focusing on the development of a broad disability or human rights
strategy based on the human rights model of disability also appear elsewhere.89 Frequent
reference has also been made to the need for legislation and policy to be reviewed and
revised to ensure consistency with the human rights model. Examples include concluding
observations in which the Committee has stressed the importance of ensuring consistency
with this model in legislation and policy at a general level,90 and in connection with more
specific statutes, policies or initiatives.91
TheCommittee has stressed the need to ensure consistencywith the human rightsmodel
in connection with the definition of disability used in various laws or policies.92 The model
was also mentioned in connection with disability assessment systems.93 The following gui-
dance in the Concluding Observations on Poland, which appears in virtually identical
language in the concluding observations on Malta, is unusual in providing a detailed elab-
oration of what the human rights model entails in this context:
Ensure a disability assessment that fully incorporates a human-rights model of disability and
takes a human rights-based approach by, inter alia,
(i) Involving organisations of persons with disabilities in the design of disability assessment
mechanisms;
(ii) Engaging persons with disabilities in generating the information on which disability assess-
ments are made;
(iii) Eliminating multiple methods of assessment;
(iv) Making information on assessment requirements accessible and user-friendly’.94
(B) recommendations for awareness-raising and training in the human rights model of
disability. Second, many of the CRPD Committee’s concluding observations mentioned
the human rights model of disability in connection with awareness-raising and train-
ing. In its concluding observations on Brazil, for instance, the Committee noted that it
was ‘concerned at the lack of strategies specifically to promote the contents of the
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Convention and the human rights model of disability to the general public, public
officials and private actors’.95 As is made clear in various concluding observations,
such as those on China, this entails portraying disabled people as ‘independent and
autonomous rights holders’ in awareness-raising programmes.96 It also entails ensuring
that such awareness-raising efforts do not exclude particular groups of disabled people,
as illustrated by the Committee’s recommendation to Canada that it adopt ‘a human
rights model of disability that recognizes autistic persons and reinforce[s] their human
dignity and value in all public campaigns and programmes to support their inclusion
in society’.97
Alongside its use in connection with awareness-raising amongst the population at large,
the human rights model has sometimes been mentioned in connection with more targeted
types of training – particularly for judges and the legal profession and for healthcare pro-
fessionals. References to the importance of relevant training for healthcare professionals
have appeared in numerous concluding observations.98 In relation to the legal profession,
the Committee recommends that steps be taken by the Canadian government to:
Raise awareness among and develop capacity-building programmes for the judiciary and law
enforcement officials about the Convention as a legally enforceable human rights instrument,
the human rights model of disability and its principles, and the jurisprudence of the Com-
mittee… 99
In its concluding observations on Argentina, the Committee similarly recommends train-
ing and capacity-building for judges but tailors this recommendation to the specific
context of legal capacity. It thus urges the State party to provide ‘training workshops on
the human rights model of disability’ to encourage judges ‘to adopt the supported
decision-making system instead of granting guardianships or trusteeships’.100
(C) concerns about deprivation of liberty and institutionalisation and their inconsistency
with the human rights model of disability. Third, reference to the human rights model is
often made in connection with concerns about systems that deprive disabled people of
liberty and subject them to institutional living. The Committee thus urges Azerbaijan101
and the Republic of Korea102 to develop support services in the community and accelerate
deinstitutionalisation strategies ‘based on the human rights model of disability’. Similar
recommendations appear in its concluding observations on Austria103 and Argentina,104
but in the specific context of mental health services and practices.
(D) involvement and consultation of representative organisations of disabled people.
Fourth, the Committee sometimes links the human rights model to recommendations
to ensure that policies or systems are designed and implemented in consultation with,
or with the involvement of representative organisations of disabled people. Most com-
monly, this linkage is made in the context of systems for assessing disability.105 It is
also to be found in other contexts, however, such as the development of disability strat-
egies106; international co-operation and sustainable development policies and pro-
grammes107; and awareness-raising initiatives.108 This suggests that involvement and
consultation, in line with Article 4(3) of the CRPD, is regarded by the Committee as a par-
ticular priority of the human rights model.
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3. The improvement thesis and its underpinning comparisons
The improvement thesis is most clearly articulated in Degener’s account of the human
rights model, which she presents in the form of six propositions about how that model
differs from the social model.109 She suggests that there has been a historic progression
from a medical model approach, to a social model approach and then to a human
rights model approach. Degener links the emergence of the human rights model to the
adoption of the CRPD110 but notes that the term ‘human rights model’ was used prior
to this.111 She makes frequent reference to the provisions of the CRPD to evidence her
account of the human rights model and, as noted above, claims that the CRPD ‘codifies
the human rights model of disability’.112
Stein and Stein’s account of the disability human rights paradigm is not dissimilar.
They note that, like the social model of disability, it ‘stresses society’s role in constructing
disability, and its responsibility to rectify disability-based exclusion’.113 At its core is ‘indi-
vidual flourishing’ and ‘dignity’.114 According to this paradigm, they suggest, ‘disabled
persons are entitled to equality by virtue of their equal humanity, not because they
satisfy sameness norms’115 – and ‘antidiscrimination as well as equality measures’
demanding the investment of resources are recognised.116 It emphasises the ‘indivisibility’
and the ‘process and outcome of human rights’.117 While not drawing on the provisions of
the CRPD in any detail or describing the CRPD as a codification of the disability human
rights paradigm, they state that the CRPD is ‘similarly oriented’ and that it will ‘obligate
States to take this approach’.118
While Degener states that the historical progression toward the human rights model
does not entail the social model being totally replaced, 119 she argues that the human
rights model ‘builds on’,120 ‘develops’121 and ‘moves beyond’122 the social model and
describes as her ‘main finding’ the observation that ‘the human rights model of disability
improves the social model of disability’.123 It is this view of the relationship between the
two models that we refer to as the ‘improvement thesis’.
As already mentioned, the comparisons or contrasts between the two models underpin-
ning the improvement thesis are set out by Degener in the form of six propositions. The
first and sixth of these identify important differences between the two models. The con-
trast underpinning Proposition 1 concerns the nature of the solidarity claims being
made by both models – the focus of the social model being claims relevant to people
who have, or who are perceived to have, a particular ‘health or body status’124 or, in the
terminology of the UPIAS/DPI model, an impairment; whereas the human rights
model concerns claims relevant to all human beings, regardless of their particular
health or body status. The contrast underpinning Proposition 6 concerns the type of
work done by each of the models. While the social model operates to describe disability,
the human rights model codifies the CRPD and as such operates as a much more detailed
‘roadmap’ for policy development.125 We do not dispute these distinctions but, as
explained in Section 4 below, interpret their implications differently.
The contrasts underpinning the remaining propositions, however, are unconvincing
when the social model is understood in the UPIAS/DPI sense. When analysed from
this standpoint, the distinctions between the two models on which the remaining prop-
ositions rest appear insignificant or illusory.
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Proposition 2 rests on Degener’s claim that ‘the social model approach to disability
policy supports anti-discrimination policy and civil rights reforms’, whereas the human
rights model is ‘more comprehensive in that it encompasses both sets of human rights,
civil and political, as well as economic, social, and cultural’.126 Other commentators
have also argued that the social model grounds a much narrower class of rights claim
than a human rights approach. For example, when arguing for a new disability human
rights paradigm in the US, Stein and Stein claim that ‘the social model has been proscribed
to a rigid concept of formal justice that narrowly treats similarly situated people as alike’127
and that ‘Because social model advocacy is grounded exclusively in formal equality
notions, legislatures have promulgated civil rights protection; by definition these antidis-
crimination prohibitions do not encompass positive rights’128
There is nothing in the UPIAS/DPI version of the social model, however, which pre-
scribes or limits the type of legal or policy measure through which societal processes of
disablement should take place. As Oliver observes, ‘there are no blueprints to guide its
implementation’ – it is a ‘practical tool’ that can be ‘adapted to specific local contexts,
needs and circumstances’.129 Its openness to different forms of policy solution also
renders the UPIAS/DPI social model potentially useful in cultures where reliance
cannot easily or safely be placed on human rights language and frameworks. A sense of
the scale of social change envisaged by early proponents of the UPIAS/DPI social
model is conveyed by the following words of Finkelstein:
[The] social model of disability has to do with the creation of a society which enables us to be
‘human’ – not just access our ‘rights’ within an existing competitive market society.130
Degener’s third proposition is that ‘the social model of disability neglects the fact that dis-
abled persons might have to deal with pain, deterioration of quality of life, and early death
due to impairment’ whereas ‘the human rights model of disability acknowledges these life
circumstances and demands them to be considered when social justice theories are devel-
oped’.131 Unlike the social model, it is claimed, the human rights model ‘values impair-
ment as part of human diversity’.132 Degener is not alone in raising concerns about the
neglect of impairment by the social model. Shakespeare andWatson have drawn attention
to such concerns in connection with an understanding of the social model they term the
‘strong’ version,133 in which the issue of impairment is not acknowledged or discussed.
They express concern that ‘many British activists in their public discourse use exactly
this “strong” version of the social model’.134 Such stifling of the acknowledgement of
impairment and what Thomas terms ‘impairment effects’,135 as Degener points out, has
been the subject of powerful and persuasive feminist critique.136
It should be pointed out, however, that the UPIAS/DPI version of the social model only
makes sense if there is some recognition – within the model – of the notion of impairment.
While the purpose of the model is to focus attention on social change, such change will be
ineffective unless it is responsive to and inclusive of different impairment types, effects and
needs. Understood in this way, Degener’s observation that the human rights model
acknowledges impairment-effects ‘and demands them to be considered when social
justice theories are developed’137 applies equally to the social model.
Another key claim made about the human rights model in the third proposition applies
equally to the UPIAS/DPI social model. This is that the model ‘values impairment as part
of human diversity’.138 As is recognised in the first proposition, the notion of impairment
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is central to the social model. Its purpose is to achieve social change, driven by the impor-
tance of adequately valuing people with impairments. In light of these reflections, any
differences between the social and human rights model contained in the third proposition
seem to be relatively minor.
The fourth proposition is that ‘the social model of disability neglects identity politics as
a valuable component of disability policy, whereas the human rights model offers room for
minority and cultural identification’.139 The focus here is on the importance of recognising
and valuing the political identity of different groups of disabled people – people who are
drawn together, for example, because of a shared experience of a particular impairment or
because of a combination of impairment and other characteristics (such as gender, sexual
orientation, age, ethnicity or religion). Degener observes that, unlike the social model, the
human rights model has space for ‘minority and cultural identification’,140 ‘gives consider-
ation to different layers of identity’ and ‘acknowledges that disabled persons may be male
or female, non-whites, children, or migrants’.141
Concerns have certainly been expressed over the years about the lack of diversity within
disabled people’smovements and their failure to embrace adequately issues of intersectional
disadvantage and multiple identity. We suggest, however, that these failings do not stem
from the UPIAS/DPI social model itself. Giving attention to effecting social change, in
line with this social model, requires an in-depth understanding of the way in which disable-
ment is experienced differently by different people – because of factors including impair-
ment-type, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, socio-economic status, age and religion.142
The fifth proposition concerns policies designed to prevent impairment. According to
Degener, ‘while the social model of disability is critical of prevention policy’ the human
rights model offers a means for assessing the extent to which impairment-prevention pol-
icies are required in order to protect the human rights of disabled people.143 The CRPD
(which, as already noted, is treated as a codification of the human rights model) makes
it clear that, as part of implementing disabled people’s right to health, States parties
must take steps to ensure equal access to public health programmes and other health ser-
vices and provide ‘services designed to minimize and prevent further disabilities’.144
Prevention of impairment for the population more generally, however, is not required
by the CRPD – with the result that investment in such programmes cannot be included
by States in sums they claim to be spending on disabled people or disability rights.
As Degener stresses, the focus of the social model’s criticism of impairment-prevention
programmes is not public health policies targeted at reducing the risk of injury, illness or
impairment per se, but the negative and tragedy-ridden images associated with impair-
ment which are often included in such initiatives. Such images and language have the
effect of creating and entrenching disabling attitudes and, as such, would indeed run
counter to the UPIAS/DPI social model. They would similarly run counter to the
human rights model and, more particularly, Article 8 of the CRPD which focuses on
awareness-raising and the combatting of disability stereotypes and prejudices. In this
respect therefore, the two models are in alignment.
The models are also, we suggest, aligned in requiring healthcare systems to be inclusive
of people with impairments and to provide services which minimise the risk of avoidable
deterioration. As Oliver stresses, the social model ‘does not ignore questions and concerns
relating to impairment and/or the importance of medical and therapeutic treatments’ but
‘acknowledges that in many cases, the suffering associated with disabled lifestyles is due
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primarily to the lack of medical and other services’.145 Interestingly, Oliver also dismissed
the idea that there was a ‘medical model of disability’, arguing that ‘there is instead, an
individual model of disability of which medicalisation is one significant component’.146
The existence of any substantive difference between the two models on the issue of impair-
ment-prevention policies is therefore questionable.
4. The complementarity thesis and its underpinning comparisons
4.1. Different types of model
4.1.1. The proliferation of models
The term ‘model’ is used in a multitude of contexts and for as many purposes. Frigg and
Hartmann list the following as examples of identified model types: ‘Probing models, phe-
nomenological models, computational models, developmental models, explanatory
models, impoverished models, testing models, idealised models, theoretical models,
scale models, heuristic models, caricature models, didactic models, fantasy models, toy
models, imaginary models, mathematical models, substitute models, iconic models,
formal models, analogue models and instrumental models’.147 In the specific context of
disability, references can now be found to the social, minority, Nordic, affirmative, cul-
tural, biopsychosocial and human rights models of disability, to name but a few.
It is not difficult to understand why models have proliferated. The early and continuing
influence of the social model of disability is no doubt an important factor because it estab-
lished the notion of a ‘model’ as fundamental to disability politics and scholarship. Later
models have generally been developed to signify some kind of departure from or refine-
ment of the social model or introduced in the hope that they will build on or re-invigorate
the momentum toward activism and social change previously achieved by the social
model. This is illustrated by the calls for a new model made by some of the UK disability
activists who participated in a recent research project led by Maria Berghs.148 In their view,
a new model – a ‘social model of human rights’ – might be needed to help challenge the
negative disability-related impact on equality, social protection and other human rights of
policies such as austerity and the shrinking of welfare states.
Nevertheless, there is a danger that multiplying models simply multiplies confusion. It
is easy to sympathise with Mike Oliver’s sentiment that:
As the person who invented the term the ‘social model of disability’, though not the ideas
behind it, I find the arrival of all these different models confusing rather than helpful.149
If such confusion is to be avoided, clarity about what is being modelled is essential.
4.1.2. The social model – a descriptive and heuristic model of disability
The subject or focus of the UPIAS/DPI social model is ‘disability’. It provides an ontology
of disability in that it describes the process of disablement and defines disability as a form
of social oppression.
The distinction between the descriptive role of a model and the explanatory role of a
theory emerges from venerable work such as that of Hawes in 1975.150 As a descriptive
model, the UPIAS/DPI social model of disability has been distinguished from explanatory
theories of disablement.151 Thomas, for instance, notes that the role of the social model is
16 A. LAWSON AND A. E. BECKETT
not to explain how or why disabling barriers exist and persist – such explanations instead
being shaped by ‘one’s theoretical perspective’.152
The UPIAS/DPI model is heuristic in that it provides a simple mechanism by which to
identify factors that disable people with impairments – factors which are external to the
individual and which are therefore capable of becoming the focus of campaigns for
social change. Critiquing the UPIAS/DPI model as though it is an explanatory theory
of disablement risks overlooking and even undermining the descriptive and heuristic func-
tions of the model. This is a point powerfully made by a number of disability activists from
outside the academy. Richard Light, for instance, has written that:
It is becoming increasingly clear that one of the key issues in disability activism – the Social
Model of Disability – is subject to repeated attacks, particularly within the academic commu-
nity. What is equally clear is that much of the ‘bad press’ has been prompted by interpret-
ations of the social model that many of us would find particularly strange.…We believe
that it is time for disabled activists to remind academics that the social model originated
with us, and that we still have use for it!153
The social model thus operates to identify where policy reform is needed. It provides
orientation for reform and, as illustrated by its role in the drafting of the CRPD discussed
above, fundamental principles to guide social change. Importantly though, it is a model of
disability – whereas the human rights model is a model of disability policy. The social
model cannot be used to provide a detailed blueprint or roadmap for policy responses
to disability – a point made clearly in Degener’s first and final propositions and by com-
mentators such as Samaha.154 The fact that it does not provide a detailed policy blueprint
allows space for flexibility with the result that, as Oliver notes, it ‘can be adapted to specific
local contexts, needs and circumstances’.155 Its function is not to provide a detailed
roadmap for law and policy but rather to provide a tool by which to question and reorient
them along with other social structures and systems. It is its redefinition of ‘disability’ as a
form of social oppression and its heuristic qualities that make the social model an effective
‘oppositional device’ – as will be explained below.
4.1.3. The human rights model – a prescriptive model of disability policy
The focus or subject of the human rights model of disability, by contrast, is not the concept
or idea of disability. The model does not provide an obvious ontology of disability. It does
not, for instance, understand disability to mean the denial of human rights – an under-
standing which would entail disability ceasing to be an impairment-based social category
and instead becoming a meta-category, applicable to everybody experiencing a denial of
human rights regardless of whether or not they have an impairment. An argument to
this effect (albeit in a different context) is advanced by Wolbring,156 who suggests that
ableism might be used to describe the oppression experienced by all groups who are mar-
ginalised on the basis of their perceived distance from some desired social norm (e.g. a
white, Western, heterosexual, working-age, cognitively and physically able, middle-class
male). To date, however, no such argument has been made in connection with the
human rights model. Accordingly, the focus of the human rights model is not the
concept of disability. Rather it provides guidance (and requirements) on policy responses
to disability. Consequently, it can be viewed not as a model of disability but as a model of
disability policy.
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The nature of the human rights model is prescriptive, rather than descriptive, in that it
answers the question ‘what should we do?’ to advance social justice for disabled people. Its
answer is that we need to progress disability policy and law reform in line with human
rights principles and obligations, as set out in the CRPD.
4.2. Different types of role or operation
4.2.1. The models as oppositional devices
Both the human rights model of disability policy and the social model of disability can be
viewed as ‘oppositional devices’157 which operate to enhance social justice for disabled
people. Oppositional devices disrupt dominant norms and provoke dissent.158 They
make possible the ‘generation, reorganisation and proliferation of… resistance-prac-
tices’159 and the refashioning of individual and collective bodies. In the remainder of
this section, we will examine the distinct operations or functions of the two models by
using the oppositional device as an analytical framework in the way developed by
Beckett and Campbell.160 This framework draws on, develops and adapts Foucault’s theor-
isation of power and resistance161 and his four-fold categorisation of technologies.162
Using this framework, we will explore the distinct roles or functions of the two models
by reflecting on how they operate as technologies of the first, second and fourth types
identified by Foucault – respectively, technologies of production, which operate to
produce or transform; technologies of sign system, which allow for the use of signs, state-
ments, symbols and meanings; and technologies of the self, which make it possible for
individuals to transform themselves. We will also consider the relationship between the
two models and Foucault’s third technology type – technologies of what Foucault
termed ‘power’, but which (like Beckett and Campbell) we refer to as technologies of ‘dis-
cipline’, in recognition of the fact that all four technology types may be described as tech-
nologies of power. Technologies of discipline, which submit subjects to control and
domination, are closely associated with machineries of government which are contested
and challenged by oppositional devices. Oppositional devices, however, may themselves
sometimes constitute concrete operations of technologies of discipline, as will be demon-
strated below in connection with the human rights model.
Using this analytical framework, we present the two models as different types of oppo-
sitional device; each harnesses the different technology types differently, in different com-
binations and to different ends. While they are distinct, we will show that the two models
are in important respects complementary in operation and utility.
4.2.2. The social model
Beckett and Campbell developed their oppositional device framework in the context of the
social model of disability. Their analysis has considerable relevance to the current discus-
sion. We draw upon their analysis and expand on it by making connections with the use of
the social model in the drafting of the CRPD, explained in Section 2 above.
First, as previously explained, the social model produces the two separate but related
concepts of impairment and disability. This is the model operating as a technology of pro-
duction. Through its identification of disability as socially created, it also produces the
concept of an unjust, disabling society with disabling barriers. Further, it produces two cat-
egories of person – the disabled person and the non-disabled person. While membership
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of the former category depends on having or being perceived to have some trait which falls
short of prevailing ability norms, such traits are often acquired over the life-course with
the result that individuals may well spend much of their life in each of the categories.
The boundaries of these categories are neither fixed nor unchanging, but dependent
upon the notion of ‘impairment’, which is itself a malleable social construction, as well
as upon issues of identity and engagement in activism.
By producing these concepts and categories, the social model operates to bring together
people with a range of body/mind traits deviating from societal ability norms, to form a
disabled people’s social movement. Solidarity, or belonging, is generated by a shared
experience of disablement through exclusionary societal structures, attitudes and practices
and by a shared commitment to resistance and social change.
This operation of the social model was evident in the drafting of the CRPD. Its most
obvious manifestation was in the AHC debates where the social model was used to
ensure solidarity between people with different impairments through resisting the incor-
poration of impairment-based distinctions in the new treaty – distinctions which might
have had the potential to reduce the standard of rights protection afforded to people
with certain impairment types (for instance, those with psychosocial or intellectual
impairments).163 The operation of the social model to produce the concepts and categories
outlined above is also evident in the way in which it was used in the AHC debates about
the guidance that the CRPD should provide on the meaning of ‘disability’ – guidance set
out most clearly in paragraph (e) of the CRPD’s preamble.164 At a higher level, it might
also be argued that the social model’s production of ‘disability’ as a form of injustice
helps to explain why it provided an underpinning point of reference in the AHC discus-
sions.165 Indeed, this function of the social model also played an important role in gener-
ating the political impetus behind the demand for a disability-specific human rights
convention.
Second, as a technology of sign systems, Beckett and Campbell argue that the social
model delineates the type of statement and practice that have come to be associated
with emancipatory disability politics.166 Examples include ‘nothing about us without
us’, ‘rights not charity’, and ‘accessibility and inclusion’. It also provides a basis from
which to challenge statements and practices which run in a contrary direction, such as
claims that ‘biology is destiny’; practices which segregate disabled people, in educational,
employment and other settings; or practices which privilege the expertise of medical or
other professionals over the life choices of the individual disabled person concerned.
Examples of how the social model operated in this way in the AHC discussions can
again be identified – particularly in the context of what was described earlier as the
model’s use to promote equality and inclusion.167 It was employed to support arguments
against segregated education, for example. It was also used, in the contexts of deprivation
of liberty and legal capacity, to challenge any framing of the new treaty which would
permit restrictions of liberty or legal capacity simply on the basis of a medical diagnosis
of a particular impairment. It was thereby used to challenge the privileging of the expertise
of medical professionals over individual autonomy and agency.
Interestingly, the published AHC documents do not suggest that explicit reference was
made to the social model in connection with arguments that the CRPD should include
requirements that governments and others involve and consult disabled people in relevant
decision-making processes.168 This is despite the fact that the phrase ‘nothing about us
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without us’ was commonly cited in the negotiations and used to influence the accessibility
and inclusiveness of the UN facilities and systems in and through which they took place.169
This phrase is closely associated with and, we suggest, delineated by the social model, the
process implications of which are sometimes neglected in favour of debates about its sub-
stantive implications. This point is also made by Samaha, who explains that ‘the social
model can influence institutional choices by shifting the demand for expertise’170 –
because framing a problem as one of tackling disadvantage or exclusion necessarily
requires different institutional expertise than would be required to address a problem
framed in terms of finding medical or technological solutions.
Finally, as a technology of the self, the social model allows disabled people ‘to work
upon themselves,… through the transformation of their bodies via the expulsion of the
personal tragedy narrative’171 and the rejection of such labels as deficient, defective,
invalid or pitiable. It thus allows them to invent themselves anew as members of an
oppressed group – disabled people – and to call for liberation and social change.
It is not easy to identify explicit examples of this operation of the social model in the
AHC negotiations. To the extent that it involves an outward focus on social change,
however, it underpins the use made of the social model to support arguments for equality
and inclusion.172 More broadly, this operation of the social model undoubtedly contribu-
ted to the development of disabled people’s movements around the world and thus helped
to generate the climate and the collective resource to nurture and shape the CRPD. The
following passage, published some ten years before the adoption of the CRPD, remains
one of the most powerful publicly available accounts of the impact of the social model
on self-image and esteem:
My life has two phases: before the social model of disability, and after it. Discovering this way
of thinking about my experiences was the proverbial raft in stormy seas. It gave me an under-
standing of my life, shared with thousands, even millions, of other people around the world,
and I clung to it. It has been my mainstay, as it has been for the wider disabled people’s move-
ment… . It has played a central role in promoting disabled people’s individual self‐worth,
collective identity and political organisation. I don’t think it is an exaggeration to say that
the social model has saved lives.173
The different operations of the social model outlined here do not function in isolation. At a
foundational level, they work together to provide the basis for the ‘new collective’174 of
disabled people and the framing of a social movement. In the words of a leading UK dis-
ability activist:
Despite the artificial nature of the label ‘disabled’, this shared experience of external barriers
allows disabled people, irrespective of their different impairments, to feel a sense of shared
identity.… [T]he social model has offered a valuable and effective tool for helping people,
disabled and non-disabled alike, to view disability in a way that does not put the ‘blame’
for disability on the disabled person.175
As Beckett and Campbell suggest,176 such operations of the social model reflect its role as
an oppositional device, representing and facilitating disabled people’s resistance to disci-
plinary practices and technologies which produce or regulate the marginalisation, categ-
orisation and subjectivation of people with impairments. In important respects
therefore, it operates to resist machineries of government and associated technologies of
discipline.177
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4.2.3. The human rights model
The human rights model can be regarded as a concrete operation of the same three of Fou-
cault’s technology types as the social model, although it operates in different ways and with
different outcomes. In addition, as explained below, it operates as a technology of disci-
pline. In the discussion which follows, we will draw brief comparisons with the social
model where this enhances clarity and, where relevant, we will support arguments with
references to how the human rights model has been used in the CRPD Committee’s con-
cluding observations (discussed in Section 2 above).
First, as a technology of production, the human rights model produces rights-holders. It
also produces the categories of rights-respecting and rights-violating States and insti-
tutions. In the interests of clarity, it should be stressed that membership of these categories
is not static or fixed – it will vary depending on which element of which particular right is
considered; and will continuously change over time.
Through these concepts and categories, the human rights model operates to bring dis-
abled people together with other human beings as part of a wider human rights movement.
Solidarity, or belonging, is generated by a shared sense of humanity and a shared commit-
ment to positive social change to enable individual flourishing based on respect for human
difference and individual dignity. The human rights model and the social model are thus
characterised by different claims to belonging – the former being focused primarily on
belonging to the human race and the latter on belonging to the political category of dis-
abled people.
This productive operation of the human rights model is reflected, to some extent, in the
references made to it in the CRPD Committee’s concluding observations. The most
obvious example is its use in connection with the importance of initiatives to raise aware-
ness of the status of disabled people as rights-holders and the implications of acknowled-
ging and respecting this status.178
Second, as a technology of sign systems, the human rights model delineates the type of
statement and practice associated with a human rights approach to disability policy. It sets
out standards of behaviour expected of States and institutions to ensure basic social justice
for disabled people and it creates and provides guidance on practices and procedures for
monitoring progress in rights-implementation. It also provides a basis from which to chal-
lenge statements and practices which run in a contrary direction. It is, for instance, not
uncommon for concluding observations to contrast the recommended human rights
model approach with alternative approaches which they label as ‘medical model’179 or
some other type of problematic model (e.g. ‘charity model’,180 institutionalization
model’181 or ‘special education model’).182
It is by operating as a technology of this type, in particular, that the human rights model
is able to offer what Degener describes as a ‘roadmap’ for change. The level of guidance as
to policy and practice offered by the human rights model is certainly much more detailed
than that offered by the social model – although the articulation of rights and obligations
in the CRPD, like all human rights treaties, of course leaves room for national variation
and different implementation strategies and practices.
Third, as a technology of the self, the human rights model allows disabled people to
work on themselves. It engenders a sense of self-respect and self-worth – a sense of
being a person who is as valuable as any other human being; of being somebody whose
choices and preferences matter; and who has rights to be included in community life
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and participate in education, employment, leisure and family life. Like the social model
therefore, the human rights model operates in ways that can be profoundly empowering
at an individual level.
Finally, in relation to technologies of discipline, the human rights model (like the social
model) can be characterised as an oppositional device operating to challenge technologies
of government which marginalise, disadvantage and disempower disabled people. In
addition, through its codification in the CRPD and via the CRPD’s national and inter-
national monitoring mechanisms, the human rights model can be understood to
operate as a technology of discipline. Discipline, in the Foucauldian sense, denotes the
techniques through which an undesirable state can be corrected and desirable behaviour
ensured. It is not merely a manifestation of repressive power. It also encompasses subtle
means through which norms and expected behaviours are inculcated and adopted by gov-
ernments, other institutions and organisations and individuals. Key to technologies of dis-
cipline is procedural codification, surveillance, examination, and mechanisms of reward or
punishment. The particular systems, at international and national levels, set up to oversee
the appropriate implementation of the CRPD, can be viewed as examples of the operation
of such technologies.
The CRPD, and its accompanying Optional Protocol, provide the basis for the estab-
lishment and functioning of the CRPD Committee as part of an international framework
for monitoring how well States are implementing CRPD rights and to provide guidance to
enhance understanding and effectiveness. Indeed the CRPD Committee’s concluding
observations are themselves part of this international monitoring process and as such con-
tribute to the delineation of relevant standards. Such observations include praise for States,
in the form of complements for particular strategies or innovations which cohere with the
CRPD and thus the human rights model; as well as criticism for regressive developments
or inaction. While the CRPD Committee does not have power to ‘punish’ States through
the imposition of sanctions, the reputational implications of public criticism from such a
body has the potential to damage the standing of governments both internationally and at
home.
Examples of how the human rights model operates as a technology of discipline can also
be found at the national level. Particularly significant in this regard are the mechanisms the
CRPD requires States parties to establish in order to co-ordinate the implementation of the
treaty and to monitor progress. Also relevant, particularly in countries with monist
approaches to international law, is the use that can be made of the CRPD in courts.183
4.3. Complementarity of the models
The human rights model of disability policy and the social model of disability have much
in common. They are both shaped by and make possible resistance by disabled people
and their allies to oppressive and exclusionary socio-political systems and practices.
They thus work toward the same broad end – but in specific ways, consistent with
key differences in the nature of the models. Most fundamentally, the human rights
model is a model of disability policy, whereas the social model is a model of disability.
The subject-matter and focus of each is therefore distinct. Each model also operates
differently.
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Close analysis of how the two models operate, of the kind carried out above, makes it
clear that it would be misleading to regard the human rights model as generally supersed-
ing or improving upon the social model. Instead, the models should be understood as per-
forming distinct functions and as working together in ways that are complementary. Two
points can be made in support of this view:
First, as discussed above in relation to technologies of sign systems and discipline, the
human rights model operates to support the development of particular types of law and
policy, together with particular governmental and intergovernmental structures and
mechanisms for overseeing and monitoring their implementation. By contrast, the
social model is more open textured. It operates in connection with emancipatory disability
politics more generally. As the analysis of the AHC debates in Section 2 above makes clear,
it can and has been used in connection with emancipatory disability politics focusing on
human rights policies and frameworks. However, it is not confined to the human rights
setting and can operate in contexts where claims and campaigning objectives are differ-
ently framed. In this sense, the human rights model is narrower in scope and less
flexible than the social model. This means that the social model will operate in some con-
texts where the human rights model does not operate to make possible disabled people’s
resistance to disabling systems and practices.
Second, the two models are complementary in that, in important respects, the oper-
ation of the human rights model is dependent on the social model. A key element of the
CRPD and therefore the human rights model is the involvement of disabled people’s
organisations in the elaboration of disability-related policies, practices and pro-
cedures.184 As is evident from the discussion above, it is the operation of the social
model as a technology of production and a technology of the self that makes possible
the formation of disabled people’s organisations which bring together people with
different impairment types to resist disablement. The solidarity engendered by the
social model is primarily between people with different types of impairment, to create
a sense of belonging to the collective of disabled people. This contrasts with the solidarity
engendered by the human rights model, which is primarily between disabled people and
all others, to create a sense of belonging to the human race. It is the social model, not the
human rights model, which brings disabled people together to form representative
multi-impairment organisations. Without it, whilst there might be impairment-
specific organisations, umbrella and other multi-impairment organisations of disabled
people would be much fewer in number and not well placed to carry out the important
roles envisaged for them by the CRPD and the human rights model. The importance of
such representative organisations to the CRPD is unsurprising given the significant role
they played in the AHC’s drafting of the treaty,185 and is highlighted and explained in
the CRPD Committee’s General Comment No 7, as well as in provisions of the CRPD
itself.186
5. Conclusion
Disabilitymodels, particularly the socialmodel of disability, have been pivotal in the history
of disabled people’s political mobilisation, the formulation of disability-related law and
policy and the development of interdisciplinary Disability Studies. The human rights
model has gained prominence and considerable influence, particularly in law and policy
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 23
contexts, since the adoption of theCRPD in 2006. The analysis we have conducted examines
the relationship between the socialmodel and the human rightsmodel and offers an alterna-
tive to the prevailing view that the latter supersedes or improves upon the former.
Our discursive analysis of the use made of each of the models in the drafting and moni-
toring of the CRPD provides context and examples for our detailed comparison of the
nature and functions of the models. On the basis of this examination, we found reason
to question the validity of many contrasts which previous work draws between the two
models and uses to provide the basis of the ‘improvement thesis’. Our own comparison
between the models endorses two of Degener’s distinctions and identifies other important
differences – including the fact that the subject-matter of the social model is disability,
whereas the subject-matter of the human rights model is disability policy.
Both the human rights model of disability policy and the social model of disability
operate as oppositional devices, formed by and at the same time making possible disabled
people’s resistance to unjust disabling societies. Both operate, in different ways, as technol-
ogies of production, sign system and the self, with the human rights model also operating, in
a very particular way, as a technology of discipline. The human rights model builds upon the
social model, and complements it. Both models are valuable tools, which skilled operators –
be they scholars, disability activists or anyone else striving to achieve equality, participation,
inclusion, quality of life and dignity for disabled people – need in their toolbox. It is impor-
tant to select the best tool for the task. For some purposes, including the monitoring of
States’ efforts to implement the CRPD, the human rights model may be more appropriate.
For other purposes, however, the social model will continue to be better suited.
Clarity about the roles of these two models and the relationship between them is essen-
tial to future scholarship in the field of disability and human rights and Disability Studies
more generally. The human rights model is important as a model of disability policy. It
provides a detailed road map for the development of human-rights-consistent law and
policy, as well as systems and frameworks for monitoring progress. The more open-tex-
tured social model operates to support emancipatory disability politics in contexts
which are not framed by reference to human rights; and continues to be pivotal to the for-
mation, amongst people who have impairments, of a resistant subjectivity based upon
shared experience of a disabling society. To operate effectively, the human rights model
must work alongside the social model. It is therefore complementary to the social
model and not an improvement upon it.
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